The PMR Foreign Minister gave a wide-ranging interview to the Hungarian online publication Mandiner. He outlined in detail the key geopolitical challenges for the republic, the ongoing impact of the conflict in Ukraine, and Moldova’s actions in energy and economy. He also spoke about Tiraspol’s position on European integration, its dialogue with Chisinau and the future of Pridnestrovie.
Has the geopolitical standing of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic changed since the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 — and if so, how?
It is premature to assess the geopolitical position of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, as global processes are undergoing transformation. As we can see, the system of international relations has failed to withstand the test of crises. In many ways, it has already been dismantled. The universal regulatory mechanisms — such as the UN and other institutions — have become dysfunctional. Borders are shifting, and so are the positions of various states and territories. It is difficult to predict what the new configuration of the international system will ultimately look like. This system will not be unipolar; it will not be a Pax Americana. However, to what extent it will be truly multipolar and reflect the interests of all global actors remains an open question. Under these circumstances, new opportunities are emerging for Pridnestrovie to strengthen its international standing and enhance its legal and political subjectivity.
Pridnestrovie was established by the will of the people. None of the newly independent states possesses such impeccable political and legal foundations for independence as Pridnestrovie. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the leadership of the MSSR — the parent state — provided the legal basis for Pridnestrovie’s independence by asserting in its founding documents that Moldova considers the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic during the Soviet era to have been illegal. Accordingly, the legal situation reverts to the period when Pridnestrovie existed separately as the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union, before Bessarabia was annexed in 1940.
Therefore, there are no legal contradictions here — there is an objective and concrete fact: the decisions of the Chisinau authorities, which laid the foundation for a new Moldovan statehood, simultaneously created the legal grounds for Pridnestrovie’s independence. Later, Moldova launched aggression against Pridnestrovie, and in order to protect the population, our society mobilized and formed its own state. The purpose of establishing Pridnestrovie was to defend the interests of the people living on our territory — a multilingual, multicultural population. We have three official languages, and this polyethnic harmony and diversity, preserved since Soviet times, is the foundation of Pridnestrovie’s internal peace and stability.
Unlike Moldova, we are not a nationalistic state, and Moldovan nationalism was one of the key factors that triggered Pridnestrovie’s move toward separation.
Of course, the Ukrainian conflict also has an extremely negative impact on Pridnestrovie — this is an objective fact. As you know, since February 28, Ukraine has completely closed its border with Pridnestrovie, making any export, import, or transit operations through Ukrainian territory impossible for us. To maintain the minimal economic activity, we were forced to operate exclusively through Moldovan territory and Moldovan customs borders. This has given the Moldovan side a powerful leverage over Pridnestrovie.
Has Moldova used this leverage?
Moldova has intensified its blockade and restrictive measures against Pridnestrovie, creating additional barriers to free trade. I would like to remind you that Pridnestrovie has an agreement with the European Union on trade under the DCFTA regime, and this agreement is currently being grossly violated by Moldova. With a certain degree of permissiveness from Brussels — which is also important to take into account.
Since January 1 of last year, Moldova has introduced illegal export-import customs duties that do not comply with either WTO rules or European Union regulations, as these duties are collected by Moldova but not returned to the budget or economy of Pridnestrovie. According to various estimates, our total losses due to these duties amount to approximately 13–15 million US dollars.
In addition, there is pressure on our leading enterprises. Pridnestrovie is an industrially oriented state — we have preserved our economic potential. Today, our enterprises are operating under conditions of artificially imposed restrictions. Under a contrived pretext, Moldova considers the products of our leading enterprises, such as the Elektromash plant, the Potentsial plant, and the Pribor plant, including household electric pumps, foil, and other technical goods, to be dual-use items. This is an unfounded claim that has been refuted by the findings of international experts.
The crisis in Ukraine has had an extremely negative impact on Pridnestrovie. This is something that must be overcome. One of Pridnestrovie’s key objectives is to demonstrate — both to the world and to our Ukrainian neighbors — that Pridnestrovie is not a source of regional instability, that we are not interested in destabilization, and that we are a peaceful, transparent, democratic state, home to approximately 100,000 Ukrainian citizens. However, since the spring of 2022, Pridnestrovie faced a series of terrorist attacks, and documentary evidence suggests that the intelligence services of neighboring Ukraine may have been among the organizers. We find ourselves in a situation where every step must be carefully calculated — we simply cannot afford mistakes. We see our future in attracting greater international attention to Pridnestrovie and in encouraging a more balanced, adequate, and honest approach from international institutions. Our independence will make the world richer, brighter, and more just — not the other way around.
For a long time, there was a status quo in the region’s energy sector: Ukraine transported gas to Pridnestrovie to supply the Kuchurgan Power Plant, which served the residents on both sides of the Dniester River. How did this status quo come to an end?
The energy situation has indeed changed significantly. There is a great deal of speculation surrounding the reasons and motives behind these changes. The Moldovan leadership places the blame on Russia. The Russian Federation, specifically the company Gazprom, which was responsible for gas deliveries, raised claims against the company Moldovagaz, which was supposed to settle the debts on behalf of the Moldovan side. That settlement never took place; accordingly, the required audit, which was part of Moldova’s obligations under the gas transportation agreement, was also not conducted. These formal economic factors altered the status quo and led to the termination of gas supplies from the Russian Federation under that agreement.
Pridnestrovie found itself in an extremely difficult situation because from January 1 until early February of this year, we had no gas at all. We were operating on the residual gas still left in the pipeline. It was used solely for public consumption. At the Kuchurgan Power Plant, only one power unit was functioning, running on coal. Unfortunately, those coal reserves have now been depleted. This minimal capacity allowed us to generate a limited amount of electricity, but we experienced rolling blackouts. Electricity was shut off for 4 to 8 hours a day. There was barely enough gas for basic cooking needs, and there was no heat and often no electricity either.
Therefore, already in the first half of January, the leadership of the Russian Federation and Pridnestrovie reached an understanding on how to resolve this issue. A company was selected that could purchase gas on European commodity exchanges. Accordingly, we proposed to the Moldovan side that gas supplies to Pridnestrovie be ensured without obstruction.
In early January, we hosted the acting OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, who confirmed that the Moldovan leadership had no objections to the supply of Russian gas to Pridnestrovie. However, as soon as we proposed this mechanism and moved toward its practical implementation, the Chisinau leadership immediately came out strongly against it.
Initially, a Moldovan company licensed to provide such services was chosen for this role. But Chisinau expressed sharp opposition, which forced an emergency search for an alternative mechanism to supply gas to Pridnestrovie and prevent the escalation of a humanitarian crisis.
We would like to express our gratitude to the Hungarian leadership, Hungarian businesses, and the companies that assumed responsibility to ensure a stable and transparent channel and mechanism for gas deliveries to Pridnestrovie. Unfortunately, the volume of gas currently reaching Pridnestrovie is still insufficient to allow all enterprises to operate at full capacity.
You touched on some aspects of the discussion surrounding the debt of JSC Moldovagaz to Gazprom. What is Pridnestrovie’s position on this matter? Is Gazprom’s demand for $700 million in debt justified, or do you place more trust in the audit organized by the Chisinau authorities, which concluded that the debt exists but is significantly smaller?
Of course, we rely on the documents and parameters that govern the mechanism of gas supply from Russia to both Moldova and Pridnestrovie. According to all available calculations, the Russian company Gazprom has fully justified its claims against JSC Moldovagaz. As far as I know, Moldovagaz does not deny the existence of this debt. So, there is no room for a ‘believe it or not’ discussion here — this is simply a legal fact.
One more question on the topic of energy. As we understand it, the European Union has provided you with a grant to help overcome the energy crisis. This comes as a surprise, since here in the EU, we are not very well informed about the existence of any relationship between Pridnestrovie and the European Union.
Pridnestrovie is grateful to the European Commission and to President von der Leyen, who initially proposed allocating €30 million for gas purchases — though the amount was later reduced to €20 million, with part of the grant redirected to Moldova. We are thankful because this assistance helped us during a particularly difficult period, before a stable gas supply mechanism had been established, allowing us to purchase and deliver gas to Pridnestrovie. It was a targeted, short-term loan.
However, already in early February — just a week after the idea of the initial loan was announced — the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Ms. Marta Kos, visited Chisinau and put forward the idea of a larger €60 million grant that could be provided to Pridnestrovie to continue gas purchases. Yet, the offer came with politicized and, in our view, rather strange conditions.
In addition to vague requirements such as upholding human rights — with which we have absolutely no issues — the European side stated that Pridnestrovie must raise utility tariffs for the population and shut down energy-intensive industries. The remaining enterprises would also have to pay higher rates. In effect, Pridnestrovie was presented with a choice: receive a loan to keep warm, but at the cost of leaving people without jobs and income needed to repay that very loan. Frankly, we found no logic in that.
Moreover, we were deeply concerned that these ideas were voiced by Moldova’s leadership, specifically the Prime Minister. In essence, Moldova conveyed demands on behalf of the European Union. It seemed as though Brussels had outsourced certain aspects of its energy policy to Chisinau, which is quite surprising. As far as I know, Moldova is not part of the European Union, and its accession prospects remain rather uncertain.
That said, we appreciate a transparent approach. But I must also note that the Russian Federation continues to support us with loans — and does so without imposing any conditions or placing additional burdens on our population.
What is your current view on the Republic of Moldova’s European integration, and do you wish to be part of this integration process?
The European integration is a very complex and lengthy process. From a formal point of view, the European Union as an institution certainly has the potential and capacity for development and enlargement. In the past, Pridnestrovie traded with the EU under the Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) regime granted to Moldova. However, since 2016, this mechanism has changed, and the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) came into effect.
In 2014, Moldova signed an agreement with the European Union and delegated part of its legitimacy and authority to the EU-Moldova Association Council. This was a pivotal moment, in our view, as Moldova essentially chose to move decisively toward integration with Europe and transferred certain political and economic functions. This marked a turning point: Moldova ceased to be a fully sovereign actor, increasingly dependent on European financial support, grants, and technical assistance.
Moreover, as it turns out, Moldova has also been financed by controversial entities such as USAID, for example. So, for Moldova, European integration seems more like an economic opportunity to improve its internal situation rather than a deeply ideological project.
As for the conceptual position of Pridnestrovie, you are aware that a referendum was held on September 17, 2006, where the population clearly expressed its will: the strategic course for Pridnestrovie is maximum alignment with Russia and, of course, independence as the foundation of this process.
The conflict between Moldova and Pridnestrovie is a protracted one. Given the unresolved nature of this conflict, it is premature to speak of any change in Moldova’s international legal status or its accession to the European Union. I am not sure Brussels would welcome another unresolved conflict on its territory, in addition to those that already exist on the European continent — such as the dispute over Northern Cyprus.
It would be far more logical to at least synchronize the EU’s enlargement efforts regarding Moldova with progress in conflict resolution. But we see no such synchronization. On the contrary, there is a complete disregard from Chisinau for the negotiation process as a whole. There have been no high-level contacts between the two sides since 2020. The “5+2” format has not convened for six years since its last meeting in October 2019 in Bratislava.
In my view, it is the European Union that should be most invested in preserving the negotiation mechanism. Yet Brussels remains a passive observer, watching as the Moldovan side systematically ignores the established negotiation frameworks. Chisinau keeps looking for excuses to avoid engaging in a meaningful dialogue with Pridnestrovie. For instance, Moldova used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to refuse meetings. During that time, it also imposed a medical and pharmaceutical blockade on Pridnestrovie blocking supplies of ventilators and medical equipment, and hindering the establishment of our own laboratories to detect coronavirus.
That was a telling moment, clearly demonstrating that Moldova does not view Pridnestrovie as a friendly partner, nor does it consider the people of Pridnestrovie to be its own citizens. Any specialist in conflict resolution or international relations would recognize the contradiction between pursuing integration and refusing to address an unresolved conflict.
The second point, which is also very important, concerns the factor of international law and the democratic nature of decision-making processes. No one has held any discussions with Pridnestrovie about cooperation in the European direction. Last year, a referendum was held in Moldova alongside the presidential election. It turned out that even despite the full use of administrative resources, the number of people who supported European integration was roughly equal to those who opposed Moldova’s EU accession.
Now imagine — for decades, there has been a powerful information, political, and ideological campaign promoting alignment with the European Union. And yet, the Moldovan population did not express unequivocal support. On the contrary, society appears deeply divided.
In our view, under such circumstances, it would be more reasonable not to rush the process of European integration, but rather to unite society so that a larger segment of the population clearly understands what is happening today, what will come tomorrow, and why this path is being pursued, including what real benefits ordinary people will receive.
After this referendum, official Moldovan propaganda promoting European integration became even more aggressive. And I’m not convinced this actually unites Moldovan society. Of course, that is Moldova’s internal affair. Pridnestrovie officially expressed its willingness to participate in the referendum. But as it turned out, Brussels had absolutely no interest in the opinion of the people of Pridnestrovie.
This is also a very paradoxical point: while considering Moldova within its Soviet-era borders — which are, I should repeat, legally invalid even from Moldova’s own legal standpoint — they should have at least sought the views of the Pridnestrovian population and more clearly outlined future prospects. But they did not.
Therefore, under these circumstances, I find it difficult to take the European integration process seriously. I can fully understand its ideological and political character — it serves as a key element supporting Moldova’s current ruling party and its power structure. But viewing Brussels as a donor of material benefits in exchange for political concessions is incompatible with the principles of normal, full-fledged interstate relations.
And the third factor is the process of accelerated absorption of Moldova by Brussels — and, incidentally, also by Romania, though that is a separate story. This creates tension in the conflict settlement process, because new rules are being introduced, and changes to the trade and economic environment are being planned. All of this ignores the fact that the conflict remains unresolved, and that Pridnestrovie has its own economic system and industrial base. For a long time now, Moldova and Pridnestrovie have maintained separate and isolated state legal systems. The process of European integration does not take the Pridnestrovian factor into account. This was also the case during the transition to the DCFTA regime — but at that time, the European Union and the European Commission showed flexibility and held separate negotiations with Pridnestrovie. As a result, we reached a special trade arrangement with the EU, which remains in effect today, although it is now being grossly violated by Chisinau.
Today, there is no such readiness. This factor objectively complicates the regional process of European integration. Brussels cannot ignore the Moldova-Pridnestrovie conflict, although, in my view, it is making a concerted effort to do so.
You’ve mentioned Pridnestrovie’s economic interests. What is the current state of Pridnestrovie’s economy following the acute phase of the energy crisis?
Unfortunately, the energy crisis has undermined Pridnestrovie’s economic potential, and the Moldovan side has, over the past few years, only intensified its blockade and restrictive measures, with the tacit approval of Western participants in the negotiation process. I would note that over the past 33 years, around 200 agreements have been signed between us and Moldova in various areas – customs, information exchange, and so on. If those agreements were actually implemented, 90% of the problems we face today would not exist, and people’s lives would be far more stable and financially secure. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, Moldova has blocked the operation of major enterprises. The resulting budget losses are significant: in the first quarter of 2025, exports fell by 57%, and total trade turnover dropped by 55%. Some Moldovan officials have made odd statements suggesting that Pridnestrovian enterprises supposedly should not receive gas and should not operate, as if this were somehow normal.
This goes beyond common sense, international law, and humanitarian approaches. Since gas is being supplied inconsistently, not all industries are able to use it for their operations. The situation is very strained. Pridnestrovie, in its struggle to survive, is forced to look for ways to cut back on infrastructure development programs. For many years, we had a major initiative—the Capital Investment Fund—which restored or built from scratch hundreds of social facilities. These included schools, kindergartens, hospitals, social care institutions, and more. Now we have no choice but to freeze this project in order to find ways to pay salaries, pensions, and social benefits to the population.
It is clear that the standard of living is also declining, and all of this constitutes a comprehensive blockade by Moldova, first and foremost. But we look to the future with optimism, because we have our multiethnic Pridnestrovian nation, and we have our unique identity that is different from that of neighboring Moldova or historical Bessarabia. That is why we firmly believe the truth is on our side. And if the international system is indeed undergoing transformation, with trends toward greater justice and balance, then Pridnestrovie has a real future ahead.
In the situation when there is an economic blockade imposed by Chisinau, when Moldova’s process of European integration is moving forward without taking into account the interests of the people of Pridnestrovie, and when the international landscape is shifting – what future do you see for Pridnestrovie?
Eastern wisdom says that every crisis is also an additional opportunity. Global and regional developments confirm this. The world can no longer remain the same. There is a vast gap between words and actions, between formalities and reality. I would remind you that since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, more than three dozen new states have emerged in the world, including countries that are now part of the European Union. There are numerous precedents in the world related to the emergence of new states. The well-known Kosovo precedent is one of them.
The international community approaches this issue rather hypocritically, especially the Western world, which has claimed that such precedents are ‘special cases’ and cannot be applied to others. But I will repeat: in none of these examples do we see the formal ‘metropolis’ itself providing the legal and legitimate grounds for independence, as Moldova did when it declared that its existence within the Soviet Union was illegal. When Moldova gained independence, it began to lay claim to the territory of Pridnestrovie, a land that historically was never part of Bessarabia. By the way, Bucharest is well aware of this fact.
As soon as the leading actors turn their attention more closely to our regional space, I am confident that Moldova-Pridnestrovie relations will become part of a positive agenda, since there is no alternative to the settlement process. Over the past three decades, Moldova has often walked away from the negotiating table, ignored dialogue, but ultimately had to return. I see no reasonable prospect or truly functional mechanism for Moldova to move toward the European Union – or perhaps even deeper integration with Romania – without resolving the conflict through transparent negotiations with the participation of international representatives. There is a more than sufficient group of stakeholders who can help establish a final and stable settlement.
The modality of this settlement must take into account two factors. De facto, the settlement has long taken place. Pridnestrovie has existed as an independent system for 35 years. If we were not restricted in our development and obstructed, I am confident that Pridnestrovie would be a significantly more successful state in every sense, including economically, than neighboring Moldova. And Moldova understands this. This can easily be demonstrated with data in hand: by analyzing financial development trends, industrial potential, and the territory of Pridnestrovie. Moldova’s population is rapidly declining, people are leaving, and as a result, Moldova is doing everything it can to worsen the situation within Pridnestrovie. Therefore, in terms of settlement, it is simply necessary to formalize at the international level the de facto reality that already exists. We should conclude a treaty of friendship and peace with Moldova. I believe that would be more than sufficient.
And the second element, which is no less important, is the opinion of the people. No one has the right to impose any integration processes, regardless of how noble the pretext may seem. One of Moldova’s leading female journalists, who is also a member of the Moldovan journalists’ council and therefore should adhere to the journalist’s deontological code, stated that the European Union should not supply gas to Pridnestrovie because, in her words, ‘it’s like casting pearls before swine’. That’s a direct quote, and in my view, it’s a shocking display of the real attitude a certain segment of Moldova’s political elite has toward Pridnestrovie. I emphasize—it’s not the attitude of the Moldovan people, I assure you. For ordinary Moldovans, the Pridnestrovian conflict is not a priority issue at all. Their goal is to survive, to hold on, and maybe to live long enough to see a better future through elections. For the elites, however, Pridnestrovie is something deeply alien, and at the same time, they lay claim to our territory, perhaps to our industrial potential.
Whatever decision the people of Pridnestrovie make, it must be followed. All international foundations, legal parameters, and even global precedents are in our favor. And especially considering the current approaches of the United States, I am confident that new precedents will emerge as well.
There must be stability, peace, and prosperity in this part of the European continent. The path to that lies in the recognition of Pridnestrovie’s international legal personality. It is time to place a logical conclusion to the process of self-determination of the Pridnestrovian people and move forward, in peace and harmony with both Ukraine and Moldova. Where Ukraine wishes to go is the choice of the Ukrainian people. Where Moldova wishes to go is the choice of the Moldovan people, who, it seems, already consider themselves Romanian, as their language is now Romanian and a Romanian identity is being imposed. The most important thing is that no one decides for us who we should be.
