The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic gave an extensive interview to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, answering questions about gas supplies to Pridnestrovie, the economic situation amid the humanitarian and energy crisis, the peacekeeping operation, and the prospects for the “5+2” format.
- Can you confirm the information that Tiraspol and Chisinau have agreed on gas supplies from the European market until February 10? Where will the republic receive gas from after this date?
Since February 1, Pridnestrovie has been receiving gas purchased with funds from an emergency financial grant from the European Union. This gas is intended solely to meet the needs of the population, ensure the operation of social and medical facilities, as well as food production. This assistance is allocated for ten days. During this time, it is crucial to finalize the contract for further stable gas supplies to the republic, and the corresponding negotiations are underway.
- President Krasnoselsky stated that Russia would provide a loan to Pridnestrovie for purchasing gas from Moldova. Has it been allocated, and if so, in what amount? Are there any deadlines for Tiraspol to repay it?
From the very beginning of the crisis, Russia has been doing everything possible to help Pridnestrovie, not only by facilitating the development of a practical mechanism for gas supplies from European markets but also by agreeing to provide a loan for their payment. It is premature to discuss the details of this assistance; however, it concerns financing volumes intended exclusively for the domestic consumption of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.
- When will Pridnestrovie start receiving Russian so-called humanitarian gas, the supply of which was agreed upon in Moscow by head of the republic Vadim Krasnoselsky?
This is not about free gas; it is about a loan provided by the Russian side for gas purchases. We hope that a stable supply mechanism for Pridnestrovie, developed with the support of the Russian Federation, will start functioning after February 10.
- How long will these supplies continue?
They will be long-term.
- What gas supply method have Moscow and Tiraspol developed? Through the Turkish Stream as an alternative to Ukraine, or by purchasing gas on the European spot market via an intermediary company?
The gas for Pridnestrovie is planned to be purchased on the European market through an intermediary company from Hungary. We are currently continuing to work with the Hungarian and Russian sides, as well as other parties, to finalize the relevant deal.
- Will the expenses be compensated by the Russian budget in any case?
The supplies will be paid for by Tiraspoltransgaz using funds from the Russian loan.
- What volume of gas is planned for purchase, and how much will it cost?
As for the volumes, I repeat, we are talking about covering Pridnestrovie’s internal needs: ensuring supply for residential and industrial consumers, heating, and electricity generation at the Kuchurgan Power Station for the population and enterprises.
-In your opinion, will the state of emergency in the republic be extended after February 8?
The state of emergency has already been extended. The humanitarian and energy crisis has caused a big damage to Pridnestrovie’s economy. Major industrial enterprises, whose contributions made up a significant share of the republican budget’s revenue, remain idle. According to preliminary estimates, losses could amount to tens of millions of dollars. Maintaining the special regime is a necessary measure.
- How is the ammunition depot in Kolbasna operating amid the crisis in the republic? The Russian military task force is stationed nearby, after all.
As far as I know, Russian military facilities in Pridnestrovie are operating as usual. Accordingly, conditions for Russian servicemen are being provided, taking into account the ongoing crisis in the republic.
- Do they have heating?
It should be understood that in January, there was no centralized heating anywhere in Pridnestrovie, except for some social and medical institutions.
- Has Tiraspol seen Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposals to supply coal to Pridnestrovie? Is the PMR in contact with Kyiv on this matter, and is it possible that the republic will accept this assistance?
Experts, including Ukrainian ones, are well aware that our power plant can operate only on anthracite, whereas the assistance offered was gas coal, which cannot be used at our facility. Converting the plant to this type of coal is technically possible but requires enormous costs and a significant amount of time, neither of which we have at our disposal. Moreover, even the availability of suitable coal would not solve all the problems, as Pridnestrovie’s heating system runs on gas. That is why the priority from the very beginning has been the rapid restoration of the republic’s gas supply. As for coal, its reserves have been nearly depleted after a month of crisis. As far as I know, according to standard regulations and safety norms, the power plant in Dnestrovsk must find a way to replenish its coal reserves.
- What is Tiraspol’s position on Chisinau’s blackmail demanding the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the region? Is there any possibility that Pridnestrovie will agree to this?
The imposition of political demands in the midst of a humanitarian and energy crisis, when hundreds of thousands of people are left without electricity and heating in winter, does not reflect humanitarian priorities – quite the opposite.
As is well known, Pridnestrovie has been open for many years to discussing any pressing issues at the negotiating table. However, it is the Moldovan side that consistently avoids mature and responsible engagement by all possible means.
The termination or modification of the current peacekeeping operation is unrealistic and impossible until the conflict is fully resolved based on democratic standards, which also means taking into account the interests of the Pridnestrovian people.
- During his visit to Moldova in 2019, Shoigu proposed removing or disposing of the ammunition stored at the Kolbasna depot. How relevant does this idea seem now? Is there any plan to develop a joint strategy, especially given the current instability?
The disposal of large amounts of ammunition is a complex technological process that is not easy to implement under the current regional conditions. The decision remains with the Russian Federation, but it is clear that it will be made considering a combination of security factors, the broader context of relations with regional countries, transit aspects, and so on. The situation today is different from that of 2019. So far, no dialogue on this topic is observed.
- The Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) stated that it had received information about the Moldovan authorities’ intention to develop a plan for a military operation in Pridnestrovie. Has Pridnestrovie reviewed this information, and how does it assess the situation? Does the PMR fear a forceful takeover attempt by Moldova?
Yes, we are familiar with the press release. As long as the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian conflict has not found a fair political resolution and Moldova continues to exert comprehensive pressure on Pridnestrovie year after year, violating people’s rights, all possible scenarios must be considered. This is precisely why the necessity and irreplaceability of the peacekeeping operation under Russia’s aegis are obvious to everyone, as it remains the key factor in maintaining peace and security on the Dniester.
- Are drill sessions with Russian peacekeepers in the Security Zone in Pridnestrovie planned for 2025? When?
Joint drill sessions for Russian and Pridnestrovian peacekeepers are held on a regular basis. This year, they will also take place according to the approved schedule.
- Does the threat of terrorism in Pridnestrovie remain today as in 2022? How do the republic’s authorities assess the possibility of a military conflict between the republic and other countries?
Unfortunately, the terrorist threat to Pridnestrovie persists, partly due to Moldova and the international community’s disregard for previous terrorist attacks on PMR territory, as well as our proposals to participate in their investigation. The yellow code for terrorist danger has been extended in the republic.
Another security challenge is the aforementioned militarization of neighboring Moldova, especially in light of the Moldovan side’s strong reluctance to sign a joint Declaration on Peaceful Approaches to Settlement.
- Do you believe the “5+2” format for conflict settlement in Pridnestrovie can be restored? Is it being conducted today in any format?
We have repeatedly emphasized that the “5+2” format has not lost its relevance. It is an essential, internationally recognized, and practical tool for resolution, with clearly defined principles and procedures. De jure, the format still exists, and none of the participants have declared any change in their status. Its work has been on pause for six years now, unduly delayed. I am confident that the international participants increasingly understand the necessity of the negotiation process. Especially against the background of the fact that Chisinau has been refusing direct dialogue at the level of the leadership of the parties for the last years. Consequently, the only way to give a real impetus to the normal resolution process is to resume the functioning of this platform, which will pave the way to solve many of the accumulated problems. The Russian Federation shares this position.
During the visit of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on January 9, we suggested to the Finnish diplomats to consider restoring the “5+2” work. We do not see any insurmountable obstacles to this. After all, even meetings of political representatives and expert (working) groups are largely derived from this format and are directly related to it.
- How has the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Chisinau affected Russian-Pridnestrovian trade cooperation? Is agricultural export from Pridnestrovie to Russia still ongoing?
First of all, the negative impact in this context came from Moldova’s blockade actions. The unmotivated restrictions imposed by Moldova affected the export of industrial goods from Pridnestrovie, which led to the shutdown of five large enterprises, primarily oriented toward the Russian market. There are also objective difficulties with logistics. As a result, Pridnestrovian exports to Russia have decreased fourfold since 2021.
- Does Mr. Krasnoselsky plan to visit Russia in the near future?
As you know, in January, the President of Pridnestrovie was in the Russian Federation on a working visit for negotiations regarding the energy crisis in Pridnestrovie and ways to resolve it. Undoubtedly, bilateral contacts will continue at various levels, including on Russian platforms. The goal of these contacts is comprehensive cooperation in the interests of the people, especially amid crises and numerous challenges. All levels and formats of bilateral cooperation should certainly be used to address priority tasks.
