The Minister of Foreign Affairs provided an update on the current situation in the republic: from the economic pressure by Moldova to the blocking of exports from Pridnestrovian industrial enterprises. He touched upon expectations for Finland’s OSCE Chairmanship, the importance of adopting the Declaration on Peaceful Approaches to Settlement, and cooperation prospects with Russia.
Chisinau refuses to sign the new text of the Declaration on Peaceful Approaches to Settlement. Moldova insists that the Declaration must include a clause on territorial integrity. Can we speak of an equal dialogue between the parties if one side refuses to sign the document on peaceful negotiations?
The fact that Moldovan chief negotiator responds to the Pridnestrovian initiative via mass media only proves that Moldova has no interest in normal interaction within the negotiation process. I would like to note that the text of the Declaration on Peaceful Approaches to Settlement which we presented back in May was discussed at the the political representatives’ session on November 19. In the course of the meeting, (Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister) Oleg Serebrian demonstrated a readiness to revise the Moldovan proposal to reference the OSCE Ministerial Council resolutions that mention so-called “territorial integrity” documented by all meeting participants. The following day, Pridnestrovian side officially submitted a revised draft of the Declaration which includes the agreed-upon provisions and formulations previously proposed within the framework of the OSCE Mission’s mediation efforts. Chisinau lacks valid arguments to avoid signing the Declaration. This is why, instead of engaging in diplomatic work, Moldova’s political representative continues to delay by expressing personal interpretations through the media. Such behavior raises doubts about the sincerity of Moldova’s peace declarations and its willingness for constructive dialogue.
Based on what is stated in Moldova, they will definitely continue the steps to integrate into the Pridnestrovian economic and fiscal space. One such step was the introduction of custom duties by Chisinau. What damage has the Pridnestrovian economy suffered from these actions? What could be the consequences of Chisinau’s further steps in this direction?
Moldova has intensified the economic pressure on Pridnestrovie since the beginning of this year. Throughout this time, the lifting of unjustified customs duties has been a key issue on the negotiation agenda, yet Moldova remains indifferent, offering no response. The motive behind such behavior is clear: over nine months, Pridnestrovian enterprises have transferred $9.5 million to the Moldovan budget. These are illegitimate financial levies extracted from the population of Pridnestrovie in the form of customs duties, which have triggered price increases for consumer goods, food products, medications, construction materials, and more.
Pressure in the customs and economic sector is not the only factor of Moldova’s discriminatory behaviour. The issues with imports, the blocking of banking activities, the toughening and transition of registration and licensing procedures to pay basis – all these actions are aimed at undermining the PMR economy. Apparently, that is how Moldova sees the so-called “integration into the common customs area”. Destructive steps of Moldova, which run contrary to the negotiation process agreements, undermine trust, erode the basis of peaceful dialogue, violate the fundamental rights of nationals in contradiction to international norms and obligations, and hinder people’s normal lives and social protection.
Three major machine-building enterprises in Pridnestrovie have been shut down because Moldova considers their products to be of dual use. Hundreds of factory workers have effectively been left without jobs. Chisinau claims that the issue is relevant for them as well. What is Tiraspol’s vision of how to solve this situation?
Sanctions against three industrial enterprises of Pridnestrovie – Moldavizolit, Potentsial, and Electromash – are yet another example of the politicized restriction of economic activity in the PMR. Chisinau blocks Pridnestrovie’s trade and economic ties, halting well-established exports of products that, as confirmed by experts at all levels, have exclusively peaceful, civilian applications. At the same time, Moldovan representatives report an increase in Pridnestrovie’s export share to European markets. This is a blatant manipulation of statistics. Thousands of Pridnestrovians, left without jobs and livelihoods, have become victims of Moldova’s political ambitions. There is a solution to this situation: to immediately initiate constructive dialogue on lifting restrictions on the foreign economic activities of Pridnestrovian economic operators. Our proposals on this matter have long been on the negotiating table.
Next year, Finland will chair the OSCE. It is already known that a new Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson will replace Thomas Mayr-Harting on the Pridnestrovian track. Can the OSCE currently take any steps to reinvigorate the settlement process on the Dniester?
This year, like several preceding ones, can be described as a “period of missed opportunities” in the negotiation process. The unjustified pause has dragged on for far too long. Each year, the rotating OSCE Chairmanship officially lists the settlement process as one of its priorities. By doing so, it assumes the responsibility, even in complex geopolitical conditions, to ensure efforts to restore communication, bring parties back to the negotiation table, implement practical initiatives, and resolve accumulated issues. However, since 2019, the stagnation of international dialogue has continued year after year, with none of the subsequent chairmanships achieving even minimal progress in the settlement process. This does not mean, however, that it will always be the case. Based on Finland’s experience as the OSCE Chair in 2008, Pridnestrovie would like to see Helsinki take an active role in the settlement. Sixteen years ago, Finland was the first to introduce the practice of appointing a Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, achieved the resumption of meetings between heads of state after a prolonged pause, and gradually restored the work of the “Permanent Conference...” platform (the then informal consultations). Finland also actively addressed banking and trade-economic issues during its chairmanship.
Pridnestrovie has traditionally been open to active work on all legitimate negotiation platforms, including cooperation with the Finnish Chairmanship. Among our priorities are the protection of human rights, the security and freedom of movement of people, the unblocking of trade-economic and banking-financial activities, the activation of diplomatic tools, and the signing of the Declaration on Peaceful Approaches to Settlement. If Finnish diplomacy in the year marking the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE demonstrates a focus on practical solutions and an equal, partnership-based dialogue, Pridnestrovie will be a reliable and consistent counterpart.
Moldova has increased the fees for issuing neutral license plates for travel abroad by 2.5 times for citizens of the Pridnestrovian Republic at Vehicle Registration Offices in Tiraspol and Ribnitsa. How do such measures affect the operation of this mechanism? Is it still in demand among Pridnestrovian drivers?
The demand for services at the Vehicle Registration Offices (VROs) in the Pridnestrovian Republic remains high. However, the number of vehicles registered monthly is significantly below planned levels due to various factors stemming from Moldova’s partial failure to fulfill its obligations. These include the refusal to register vehicles imported after April 24, 2018, a shortage of Moldovan specialists, and issues with driver’s licenses. Unreasonably high fees are another negative factor under discussion. Pridnestrovie emphasizes that Moldova does not bear the costs of manufacturing neutral license plates, utility payments, other services, or routine building maintenance. Therefore, Moldova has clear opportunities to implement lower tariffs at the VROs in Tiraspol and Ribnitsa.
In Moldova, politicians and experts have launched a real information campaign claiming that Russia is allegedly changing its policy towards Pridnestrovie. What do you think is behind this? How would you assess Pridnestrovian-Russian relations today?
The relations between Russia and Pridnestrovie are those of strategic partnership and historically established alliance, rooted in centuries-old ties, including the evident closeness of the identities of the Pridnestrovian and multiethnic Russian peoples. Russia fully fulfills its peacekeeping mission on the Dniester, responsibly carries out its obligations as a mediator and guarantor in the negotiation process, and provides social and humanitarian support to the population of Pridnestrovie, including Russian nationals.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that Moldova seeks to disrupt these important ties for Pridnestrovie. It expels Russian diplomats, hindering the operation of the consular service office in Tiraspol; effectively redirects a portion of Russian humanitarian aid into its budget through customs duties. This aid is meant for the most socially vulnerable Pridnestrovians in the form of pensions and so-called “bread money”. Moldova also exerts widespread psychological pressure on Pridnestrovians with Russian citizenship during control procedures at the airport and prohibits exports to the Russian market.
However, it is important to understand that the international situation, despite the depth of its contradictions, is dynamic, and any imposed restrictions cannot last forever. I have no doubt that in the future, business, humanitarian, and cultural relations between Pridnestrovie and Russia will reach a new level of development, as we share a solid common historical and civilizational foundation.
The attacks on the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester continue. Recently, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated that Russia must withdraw its troops from Pridnestrovie, and the Moldovan Foreign Ministry accused Moscow of violating constitutional neutrality through the presence of Russian troops on the Dniester. What risks do such statements from Chisinau pose for maintaining peace and stability in Pridnestrovie?
In times of geopolitical instability and various upheavals, the leadership of any state must demonstrate particular balance and foresight, which, unfortunately, is often lacking on the part of neighboring Moldova. Russian military forces in Pridnestrovie carry out entirely legitimate and agreed-upon tasks aimed at maintaining peace and security, thereby not violating Moldova’s “neutrality”. On the contrary, they create conditions for the peaceful continuation of the settlement process. The opposite is true of the numerous centers of US, NATO, and EU paramilitary presence in Moldova with uncertain purposes and objectives. In Pridnestrovie, there is full support for the activities of the peacekeeping operation and the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), as confirmed by the results of a referendum. Notably, according to Moldovan sociological surveys, the constitutional principle of neutrality enjoys substantial public support in Moldova. The peacekeeping mission retains its full legal, diplomatic, and organizational legitimacy, along with social approval. Pridnestrovie will continue its active participation in the governing bodies of the peacekeeping operation such as the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and Joint Military Command (JMC), regardless of politically motivated declarations intended for external audiences.
Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova Oleg Serebrian recently stated that the reintegration of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic would cost approximately one billion US dollars. At the same time, officials in Chisinau believe that the potential unification of Pridnestrovie and Moldova would pay off quickly. How is this calculation viewed in Tiraspol? Is such a scenario possible, given that Chisinau has not yet submitted its plan for the settlement of the frozen conflict?
Discussions on the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian conflict within the logic of “calculation” merely signify a lack of real understanding of the core of this complex issue. Consequently, there is the inability and unwillingness to resolve the conflict in a responsible and adequate way.
Ten years ago a billion of dollars was stolen from the Moldova’s banking system. Over the past four years, Chisinau has received more than 3 billion dollars in external aid in the form of grants and loans. However, the negotiation process situation is deteriorating. The situation in Moldova itself is no better. As we can see, years of active spending of Western financial resources have yielded no tangible practical results. It seems that Chisinau is finding it increasingly difficult to attract external resources, as evidenced by the chief Moldovan negotiator starting to speculate on the financial cost of conflict resolution. Based on what my counterpart stated, it amounted to a full-blown session of self-exposure and a public admission that Moldova is already exploiting Pridnestrovie, plans to increase such exploitation, and is eyeing Pridnestrovian resources and enterprises (notably, he estimated Moldova Steel Works in Ribnitsa to be worth a billion dollars).
Recently, Oleg Serebrian has also complained that Tiraspol had allegedly refused to establish a Working Group on Energetics within the “1+1” platform. How do you think such the group could positively affect the current situation?
My counterpart, in an attempt to evade responsibility for past miscalculations, continues to propagate fabrications. Neither Oleg Serebrian nor his predecessors have proposed a special discussion on gas supply and energy issues within the negotiation process, included this topic on the agenda in recent years, or initiated the creation of Expert (Working) Groups. There are no such requests in our diplomatic correspondence to this day. Our recent meeting as political representatives took place on November 19, during which Serebrian did not raise the gas issue, something that can be confirmed by the mediators and observers who were personally present at the session. It seems that, amid looming problems, Moldovan representatives are attempting to justify their inaction and unwillingness to engage in substantive work with Pridnestrovie. However, such fabrications are easily verifiable, though they leave a sour taste behind.
