Vitaly Ignatiev: Moldova Wants to Offset Russia’s Presence in the Region

10/25/23

The PMR Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev answered questions from a RIA News journalist. The Foreign Minister dwelt on Chisinau’s confrontational approaches, the prospects for settling the Moldova-Pridnestrovie conflict in the context of Moldova’s European integration, and the active militarization of the neighboring state. Separately, the PMR Foreign Minister spoke about the blocking by the Moldovan side of export supplies of three Pridnestrovian leading industrial enterprises.

- This week, the PMR Foreign Ministry stated that Chisinau has increased pressure on Pridnestrovie and is blocking the export of machine-building enterprises. What can this step of Moldova lead to if it is not settled promptly? Is there any reaction from international partners to this?

- Since August the Moldovan side, under the guise of bureaucratic procedures, has been restricting export supplies of three Pridnestrovian leading industrial enterprises. The political background of Chisinau’s restrictive actions is obvious, because earlier this nomenclature of goods from our enterprises was exported without any problems. Today, the warehouses of the enterprises are filled with final products that are still difficult to ship abroad, and contractual obligations to counteragents in Russia, Central Asian countries and members of the European Union have been disrupted. The legitimate rights and interests of the workers at these enterprises have been violated. Some enterprises were forced to suspend production. About 900 workers were forced to go downtime.

As a result of the undertaken diplomatic efforts, the representatives of the international participants to the negotiation process were able to ascertain the unjustified nature of Moldova’s actions. A typical example: a European contractor is a customer for the products of a Pridnestrovian enterprise, often produced from European raw materials, which fully comply with all EU requirements and do not stay in Moldova but are sent in transit to one of the EU countries. However, the Moldovan customs service suddenly has some “doubts”, which prompt long bureaucratic procedures, and the factory suffers losses.

Pridnestrovian diplomacy will continue its efforts to remove artificial restrictions. In the coming days we expect a number of visits by international representatives to the affected enterprises and a clearer reaction from the mediators in the negotiations, primarily the OSCE.

-At the briefing following the meeting of the Supreme Security Council, Maia Sandu called Russia the biggest threat to national security? Does this position of Chisinau create new risks and threats for Pridnestrovie?

- Judging by the public reaction of some of the Russian leadership, today there is an understanding that official Chisinau is pursuing an unfriendly course in its foreign policy. This approach clearly harms the interests of preserving peace and stability in the regional space, since the Russian Federation is a guarantor country and mediator in the Moldova-Pridnestrovie negotiation process, a unique peacekeeping operation is conducted on the Dniester under its auspices in terms of its efficiency.

As we can see, problems and crises in relations between Pridnestrovie and Moldova tend to intensify due to confrontational approaches, including the refusal of the Moldovan side to fulfil earlier undertaken commitments. No meetings in the 5+2 international negotiation format have been held for the fourth year in a row.

In the context of the many unresolved tasks on the way to achieving a just and comprehensive settlement of the conflict, attempts by Moldova to force Russia to offset its legitimate presence in the most important mechanisms are a priori destructive. For instance, the decision by Moldovan authorities to radically reduce the staff of the Russian Embassy in Moldova has already provoked difficulties in the work of the Joint Control Commission, the governing body of the peacekeeping operation.

Moldova is increasingly talking about the withdrawal of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Pridnestrovie, which is an integral part of the peacekeeping mission, and has even started talking about withdrawal from the 1992 Agreement, which would mean the destruction of the existing peacekeeping mechanism. All these are certainly risk factors that must be taken into account in order to prevent destabilization of the regional situation.

-The European Union is working towards allocating 50 million euros from the European Peace Facility to the Moldovan armed forces next year. What can this militarization of Moldova lead to, given the fact that the country still has not resolved its territorial conflict? At the same time, there are statements from Chisinau to use the experience of Azerbaijan.

-I would like to point out that this aid package from the European Peace Facility is the fourth since 2021, and its total amount has reached 137 million euros. For comparison, this exceeds Moldova’s annual military budget, which itself is growing at record rates year by year. At the same time, financial support to Moldova is also provided by Western countries, from where military equipment, drones, infantry equipment and armaments come to the neighboring state. Officials both in Moldova and in the West claim that the conflict should be solved only by peaceful means, but in practice we see actions of a different nature. Demonstrative injections into the Moldovan army, an unprecedented number of joint exercises with NATO countries’ contingents, and the constant trainings of reservists can hardly be explained other than as military preparations.

Active militarization of one of the parties to the unresolved conflict causes concern not only for Pridnestrovians, but also for Moldovans. It is clear to everyone that by such actions Western countries make an external contribution to instability, which increases the general distrust of their approaches.

The arms buildup creates an additional temptation to solve the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian conflict by force, and hardly anyone can guarantee that “daredevils” will not prevail in Chisinau, as in the early 1990s. The only effective guarantee is a peacekeeping operation on the Dniester.

Today, some individuals in Moldova are calling to use the “experience of Azerbaijan”. Meanwhile, in the historical context, this “experience” is an obvious tragedy for the two peoples: tens of thousands are killed, hundreds of thousands are refugees, a series of humanitarian crises. It is not a model for conflict resolution. Only fully inadequate people can wish to replicate such an “experience”.

-Many experts have paid attention to the statements by the Moldovan leadership that it does not rule out possible integration into the EU only of the right bank, without Pridnestrovie. What could it mean? Can we conclude from this that Chisinau is not interested in a peaceful settlement of the Pridnestrovian issue?

First of all, this is a question for the Moldovan authorities.

Probably, Chisinau is considering various scenarios of integration into the European Union. And if we proceed from the public comments of officials, the model of Moldova’s unification with Romania, an EU member, as a certain form of integration into the European space, is not excluded.

We also hear statements that a closer integration of Moldova with the EU without Pridnestrovie is being discussed. This has its own logic. Indeed, the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian conflict remains unresolved. At the same time, for more than thirty years Moldova and Pridnestrovie have developed as two separate states, where different peoples live, each of which has its own identity, values, aspirations and priorities. Moreover, during the same period new generations of citizens grew up in the two republics on an absolutely different value and ideological basis. The difference in attitude towards historical and political realities is enormous. Case in point: it is enough to say that modern Pridnestrovie is literally an “ark”, where the original Moldovan language as a value-cultural basis of the Moldovan people has been preserved, while in neighboring Moldova it has been legally “abolished” and replaced by Romanian.

As well known, the acquisition of the “candidate” status by the Republic of Moldova was not discussed or agreed upon with Pridnestrovie in any way. Hence, even at the preliminary preparatory stage, both Chisinau and Brussels actually realized that Pridnestrovie is a completely separate state subject. Inevitably, a moment will come when there will be a political and legal need to formalize the objective reality, which de facto has long been established.

-At the meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State, Vladimir Putin said that Moldova was losing its identity. According to him, the elites of this country believe that they are not Moldovans, but Romanians. How does Tiraspol feel about the fact that Chisinau is rapidly integrating with Romania? What will happen to Pridnestrovie if the Moldovan elites decide to unite Moldova and Romania?

The reality is such that even though the Moldovan-Romanian “unirea” has not been formalized de jure, it has already practically taken place de facto. Moldova has abandoned its own history and language, replacing them with Romanian ones; its top officials and even the heads of its special services are Romanian citizens. Key state assets, such as the gas transmission system, are transferred to Romania. With the support of the Moldovan authorities, the Bessarabian Metropolis of the Romanian Orthodox Church is rapidly expanding its influence on Moldovan territory. The list of such signaling factors could go on. All this is the choice of neighboring Moldova.

Pridnestrovie has its own path determined by the will of the people, in whose interests we continue to work, strengthening Pridnestrovian statehood.

Source: RIA News